Maintenance of this FAQ is now shared between the following:
The <Viruses and the Macintosh> FAQ is now co-maintained by David Harley and Susan Lesch, and the authoritative version is the one at http://www.macvirus.com/.
This document is an honest attempt to help individuals with computer virus-related problems and queries. It can not be regarded as being in any sense authoritative, and has no legal standing. The authors accept no responsibility for errors or omissions, or for any ill effects resulting from the use of any information contained in this document.
Not all the views expressed in this document are those of the maintainers, and those views which are those of the maintainers are not necessarily shared by their respective employers.
It may not be reproduced for profit or distributed in part or as a whole with any product or service for which a charge is made, except with the prior permission of the copyright holders. To obtain such permission, please contact one of the co-maintainers of the FAQ.
Such permission will normally be forthcoming as long as
(1) reproduced text is quoted accurately
(2) it is made clear that such text is derived from the FAQ
(3) it is made clear that the latest version of the FAQ is available
from the newsgroup and from the official home of the FAQ on
the world-wide web, which is currently
<http://www.sherpasoft.com/acvFAQ/>
(4) the e-mail addresses of all co-maintainers of the FAQ are
included as a contact point.
The FAQ is also available at:
We recommend that you read this FAQ in conjunction with the comp.virus (VIRUS-L)FAQ, which gives more detailed information regarding some issues which are, inevitably, covered in both FAQs.
The VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ is regularly posted to the comp.virus newsgroup. The latest version should be available at:
Vesselin Bontchev, Dennis Boon, Bruce Burrell, Graham Cluley, Henri Delger, Edward Fenton, Nicola Ferri, Sarah Gordon, David Harley, R. Wallace Hale, Norman Hirsch, Matthew Holtz, Jan Hruska, Mikko H. Hypponen, Douglas A. Kaufman, Tom Kelchner, Paul Kerrigan, Chengi (Jimmy) Kuo, Susan Lesch, Gerard Mannig, Martin Overton, Mike Ramey, Perry Rovers, Tom Simondi, Megan Skinner, Fridrik Skulason, Robert Slade, Alan Solomon, Ken Stieers, Hector Ugalde, George Wenzel, Caroline Wilson, and Tarkan Yetiser.
[Apologies to anyone who's fallen off the list.]
Acknowledgement is also due to the work of Ken Van Wyk, former moderator of VIRUS-L/comp.virus, and the contributors to the comp.virus FAQ.
Thanks also to ked@intac.com (aka Phreex), who mailed me a copy of the FAQ he posted to a.c.v. some months before this one was begun, David J. Loundy for assistance regarding legal issues, and to Nick FitzGerald, the moderator of comp.virus and maintainer of the comp.virus FAQ.
Don't just ask "I've got xyz virus, can anyone help me".
If you think you may have a virus infection, stay calm. Once detected, a virus will rarely cause (further) damage, but a panic action might. Bear in mind that not every one who thinks s/he has a virus actually does (and a well-documented, treatable virus might be preferable to some problems!). Reformatting your hard disk is almost certainly unnecessary and very probably won't kill the virus.
If you've been told you have something exotic, consider the possibility of a false alarm and check with a different package.
If you have a good antivirus package, use it. Better still, use more than one. If there's a problem with the package, use the publisher's tech support and/or try an alternative package. If you don't have a package, get one (see section on sources below). If you're using Microsoft's package (MSAV) get something less out-of-date.
Follow the guidelines below as far as is practicable and applicable to your situation.
Try to get expert help before you do anything else. If the problem is in your office rather than at home there may be someone whose job includes responsibility for dealing with virus incidents.
Follow the guidelines below as far as is practicable and applicable.
Most viruses are comparatively harmless, and may be present for years with no noticeable effect: some, however, may cause random damage to data files (sometimes insidiously, over a long period) or attempt to destroy files and disks. Others cause unintended damage. Even benign viruses (apparently non-destructive viruses) cause significant damage by occupying disk space and/or main memory, by using up CPU processing time, and by the time and expense wasted in detecting and removing them.
A Trojan Horse is a program intended to perform some covert and usually malicious act which the victim did not expect or want. It differs from a destructive virus in that it doesn't reproduce, (though this distinction is by no means universally accepted).
A dropper is a program which installs a virus or Trojan, often covertly.
A worm is a program which spreads (usually) over network connections. Unlike a virus, it does not attach itself to a host program. In practice, worms are not normally associated with personal computer systems. There is an excellent and considerably longer definition in the Mk. 2 version of the Virus-L FAQ.
(The following is a slightly academic diversion)
A lot of bandwidth is spent on precise definitions of some of the terms above. I have Fridrik Skulason's permission to include the following definition of a virus, which I like because it demonstrates most of the relevant issues.
#2 The replication is intentional, not just a side-effect.
#3 At least some of the replicants are also viruses, by this definition.
#4 A virus has to attach itself to a host, in the sense that execution of the host implies execution of the virus.
#2 is necessary to exclude for example a disk-copying program copying a disk, which contains a copy of itself.
#3 is necessary to exclude "intended" not-quite-viruses.
#4 is necessary to exclude "worms", but at the same time it has to be broad enough to include companion viruses and .DOC viruses.
Boot sector viruses alter the program that is in the first sector (boot sector) of every DOS-formatted disk. Generally, a boot sector infector executes its own code (which usually infects the boot sector or partition sector of the hard disk), then continues the PC bootup (start-up) process. In most cases, all write-enabled floppies used on that PC from then on will become infected.
Multipartite viruses have some of the features of both the above types of virus. Typically, when an infected file is executed, it infects the hard disk boot sector or partition sector, and thus infects subsequent floppies used or formatted on the target system.
Macro viruses typically infect global settings files such as Word templates so that subsequently edited documents are contaminated with the infective macros.
The following virus types are more fully defined in the comp.virus FAQs (see preamble):
A file virus infects other files when the program to which it is attached is run, and so can spread across a network (often very quickly). They may be spread from the same sources as boot sector viruses, but also from sources such as Internet FTP sites and bulletin boards. (This applies also to Trojan Horses.)
A multipartite virus infects boot sectors and files. Often, an infected file is used to infect the boot sector: thus, this is one case where a boot sector infector could spread across a network.
One sensible setting to make (if your CMOS allows) is to adjust the boot sequence of your PC. Changing the default boot-up drive order from A: C: to C: will mean that the PC will attempt to boot from drive C: even if a floppy disk has been left in drive A:. This way boot sector virus infection can often be avoided. Remember, however, to set your CMOS back temporarily if you ever do want to boot clean from floppy (for example, when running a cryptographical checksummer after a cold boot).
SCSI controllers have their own BIOS. On some systems, this will override the boot sequence set in CMOS. It's always a good idea to check with a (known clean) bootable floppy after you've disabled floppy booting that it really is disabled. I don't think it's necessary to use the Rosenthal Simulator to do this, thank you, Doren.
Most of the people who post here have their favourites: if you just ask which is the best, you'll generally get either a subjective "I like such and such", recommendation of a particular product by someone who works for that company, or a request to be more specific about your needs. Some of us who are heavily involved with virus control favour using more than one package and keeping track of the market. Don't trust anything you read in the non-technical press. Don't accept uncritically reviews in the computing press, either: even highly-regarded IT specialists often have little understanding of virus issues, and many journalists are specialists only in skimming and misinterpreting. Magazines like Virus Bulletin and Secure Computing are much better informed and do frequent comparative reviews, and are also informative about their testing criteria, procedures and virus suites. Recently, a number of articles have been posted here by people who've run their own tests on various packages. These are often of interest, but should not be accepted uncritically. (No-one's opinion should be accepted uncritically!)
Valid testing of antivirus software requires a lot of care and thought, and not all those who undertake it have the resources, knowledge or experience to do it properly.
You may get a more informed response if you specify what sort of system you have - DOS, Windows, Win95, WinNT, Mac? XT, AT, 386 or better? Is the system networked, and are you asking about protecting the whole network? (What sort of network?) Are you running NT, OS/2 or Win95, any of which involve special considerations? Be aware that there is more than one way of judging the effectiveness of a package - the sheer number of viruses detected; speed; tendency to false alarms; size (can you run it from a single floppy when necessary?); types of virus detection & prevention (not at all the same thing) offered (command-line scanning, TSR scanning, behaviour blocking, checksumming, access-control, integrity shell etc.); technical support etc.
One possible (but imperfect) measure of a package's efficiency in terms of virus detection is ICSA approval. Under the current testing protocol, a scanner must detect all viruses on the Wild List plus 90% of NCSA's full test suite. See http://www.icsa.net/services/product_cert/ for details.
Comprehensive product reviews can sometimes be found at the following sites, but are not necessarily the latest available.
Many anti-virus packages are available from the SimTel mirrors:
Please note that the maintainers have not tested or even seen all the packages listed here, and listing here does not imply recommendation (though we won't list anything we know is rubbish....).
AntiViral Toolkit Pro (commercial with evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT, OS/2, NetWare.
URL: http://www.avp.com
http://www.avp.ch
http://www.avp.tm
http://www.avp.ru
AVAST!, AVAST32 (Commercial with evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT.
URL: http://www.anet.cz/alwil/
Calluna Hardwall (Hardware-based virus protection)
Platform(s): Win3.x, Win95, NT.
URL: http://www.hardwall.com/
ChekMate (Integrity Checker; commercial w/ evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, OS/2.
URL: http://chekware.simplenet.com/cmindex.htm
ESafe Protect
Platform(s): Win95/98, NT.
URL: http://www.esafe.com/
F-Prot (Free for personal, non-commercial use)
Platform(s): DOS with limited Windows support
URL: http://www.complex.is
F-Prot Professional (Commercial; distributed by both Command Software
and DataFellows)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, WinNT, NetWare
URL: http://www.commandcom.com/
http://www.DataFellows.com/
More details inc. in PRO.DOC, supplied with the shareware version.
InoculateIT (formerly InocuLan) - Commercial with freeware version)
Platform(s): Win95/98, NT, Netware.
URL: http://www.cai.com/products/inoculateit.htm
Integrity Master (Commercial with evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT, OS/2.
URL: http://www.stiller.com
Invircible (commercial with evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT.
URL: http://www.invircible.com/
Note: The creators of InVircible have marketed it as the be-all and
end-all of anti-virus products. As with any product, the buyer
should beware such outlandish claims.
McAfee VirusScan (also Dr. Solomon's products) - eval versions available
Platform(s): DOS, Windows, Win95, NetWare, Mac, NT, Lotus Notes,
Groupware, Exchange, SunOS, Solaris, FreeBSD, Linux.
URL: http://www.nai.com
Microsoft (Macro Virus fixes)
URL: http://www.microsoft.com
Note: Microsoft anti-virus (MSAV) is no longer supported. If you're using
it, get something else (anything else). MSAV is not adequate
protection as it does not protect against current viruses.
There is a paper by Yisrael Radai which documents many of the other
problems with MSAV and CPAV.
MIMESweeper (Mail scanning 'firewall')
Platform(s): Domino, SMTP, Exchange, Raptor
URL: http://www.mimesweeper.com
NH&A (Distributors of various anti-virus products; see URL for details)
Platform(s): Various, depends on the product
URL: http://www.nha.com
Norman Virus Control
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95, NT, OS/2, NetWare, Lotus Domino, Exchange.
URL: http://www.norman.com/
Norton Anti-virus, Symantec Anti-virus for Mac
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, Mac (SAM), NT, NetWare, OS/2,
Lotus Notes, Exchange.
URL: http://www.symantec.com/
Panda Anti-Virus
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT, OS/2.
URL: http://www.pandasoftware.com
PC-Cillin, InterScan, Scanmail, Serverprotect
Platform(s): Win95/98, NT, Lotus Notes, Exchange, Outlook, cc:mail.
URL: http://www.antivirus.com/
Reflex Magnetics Ltd - DiskNet, Macro Interceptor, and Data Vault
Platform(s): Win95/98, NT.
URL: http://www.reflex-magnetics.co.uk/
ScanMaster for Novell/Vines (Uses McAfee VirusScan engine)
URL: http://www.netpro.com
Sophos Sweep (commercial with evaluation versions)
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT, Mac, OS/2, Netware, AIX, Linux,
FreeBSD, HP-UX/HP-PA, SCO, Solaris, OpenVMS, Banyan VINES.
URL: http://www.sophos.com/
VirusBUSTER, MacroVirusBUSTER, CyberBUSTER
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT
URL: http://www.leprechaun.com.au/
VirusNet
Platform(s): DOS, Win3.x, Win95/98, NT
URL: http://www.safetynet.com
In the event of a real tragedy, there are a number of firms which specialise in data recovery. Examples include:
Ontrack Data Recovery, Inc.
URL: http://www.ontrack.com
DataRescue:
URL: http://www.datarescue.com/
http://www.hitchhikers.net/av.shtml
http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/virus
http://www.nc5.infi.net/~wtnewton/vinfo/master.html
The WildList (List of viruses currently 'in the wild' - doesn't include much description)
There are also virus simulators, which are not quite the same thing. These are sometimes advocated as a means of testing antivirus packages, but there are dangers to this approach: after all, a package which detects one of these simulators as the virus it detects is, technically, false-alarming.
See section F6 of the Mark 2 Virus-L FAQ, which is rather good on types and uses of virus simulation.
Books which may be of use:
Computers Under Attack (ed. Denning) - Addison-Wesley
Aging, but some classic texts
Survivors' Guide to Computer Viruses (ed. Lammer) - Virus Bulletin
Uneven, but includes useful stuff from Virus Bulletin
Dr. Solomon's Virus Encyclopedia
You may from time to time find copies of an older edition
of this in bookshops, though it's better known as part of
Dr. Solomon's AntiVirus ToolKit. It's a pretty good guide
to some of the older viruses.
A Short Course on Computer Viruses (F. Cohen) - Wiley
By the man who 'invented' the concept of computer viruses.
Some aspects are controversial, but a good introduction to
his work.
Useful (and expensive) periodicals:
Secure Computing
http://www.westcoast.com
Computers and Security
Elsevier Advanced Technology
PO Box 150
Kidlington
Oxford
OX5 1AS
44 (0) 1865-843666
a.verhoeven@elsevier.co.uk
The Disaster Recovery Journal (more info & on-line articles)
http://www.drj.com
There are products which scan some Unix systems for PC viruses, though any machine used as a file server (Novell, Unix etc.) can be scanned for PC viruses by a DOS scanner if it can be mounted as a logical drive on a PC running appropriate network client software such as PC-NFS.
Unix servers running as webserver, ftp servers, intranet servers etc. should be considered as a potential source of files infected with viruses specific to other platforms, even if they are not directly infectable themselves. This problem is sometimes referred to as the 'latent virus problem', or 'heterogeneous virus transmission'.
Intel-based PCs running Unix (e.g. Linux, 386BSD, SCO Unix etc.) can also be infected by a DOS boot-sector virus if booted from an infected disk. The same goes for other PC-hosted operating systems such as NetWare.
While viruses are not a major risk on Unix platforms, integrity checkers and audit packages are frequently used by system administrators to detect file changes made by other kinds of attack. However, Unix security is outside the scope of this FAQ (see comp.security.unix).
In fact, such packages generally target PC viruses more than the handful of Unix viruses.
See also the Unix section in the Virus-L/comp.virus FAQ.
A useful book:
Most current macro viruses and trojans are specific to Microsoft Word and Excel: however, many applications, not all of them Windows applications, have potentially damaging and/or infective macro capabilities too.
Macro languages such as WordBasic and Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) are powerful programming languages in their own right. Word and Excel are particularly vulnerable to this threat, due to the way in which the macro language is bound to the command/menu structure in vulnerable versions of Word, the way in which macros and data can exist in the same file, and the eccentricities of OLE-2.
For further info on macro viruses, you might like to try the main antivirus vendor sites.
You can get this and other CIAC notices from the CIAC Computer Security Archive.
There have been at least two attempts to pass off Trojans as an upgrade to PKZip, the widely used file compression utility. A recent example was of the files PKZ300.EXE and PKZ300B.ZIP made available for downloading on the Internet. An earlier Trojan passed itself off as version 2.0. For this reason, PKWare have never released a version 2.0 of PKZip: presumably, if they ever do release another DOS version (unlikely, at this date, in my opinion), it will not be numbered version 3.0(0). In fact, there are hardly any known cases of someone downloading and being hit by this Trojan, which few people have seen (though most reputable virus scanners will detect it). As far as I know, this Trojan was only ever seen on warez servers (specialising in pirated software).
There are recorded instances of a fake PKZIP vs. 3 found infected with a real live in-the-wild file virus, but this too is very rare. To the best of my knowledge, the latest version of PKZip is 2.04g, or 2.50 for Windows.
There was a version 2.06 put together specifically for IBM internal use only (confirmed by PKWare). If you find it in circulation, avoid it. It's either illicit or a potentially damaging fake.
The recent rash of resuscitated warnings about this is at least in part a hoax. It's not a virus, it's a trojan. It doesn't (and couldn't) damage modems, V32 or otherwise, though I suppose a virus or trojan might alter the settings of a modem - if it happened to be on and connected.... I don't want to get into hypothetical arguments about programmable modems right now. It appears to delete files, not destroy disks irrevocably.
It's certainly a good idea to avoid files claiming to be PKZip vs. 3, but the real risk hardly justifies the bandwidth this alert has occupied.
There are rarely enquiries about viruses on other computing platforms raised in alt.comp.virus, but there is some information concerning viruses on most platforms available at the Virus Test Center in Hamburg.
See the section above on Virus Descriptions for sites where information is available.
CIAC have now set up a hoaxes web page at:
There are lots of useful links at:
- -----------------extract-------------------------------
INFORMATION BULLETIN
H-05 Internet Hoaxes: PKZ300, Irina,
Good Times, Deeyenda, Ghost
November 20, 1996 16:00 GMT
PROBLEM: This bulletin addresses the following hoaxes and erroneous
warnings: PKZ300 Warning, Irina, Good Times, Deeyenda, and
Ghost.exe
PLATFORM: All, via e-mail
DAMAGE: Time lost reading and responding to the messages
SOLUTION: Pass unvalidated warnings only to your computer security
department or incident response team. See below on how to
recognize validated and unvalidated warnings and hoaxes.
VULNERABILITY New hoaxes and warnings have appeared on the Internet and old
ASSESSMENT: hoaxes are still being cirulated.
- ---------------------end extract--------------------------------
(1) There is no Good Times virus that trashes your hard disk and launches your CPU into an nth-complexity binary loop when you read mail with "Good Times" in the Subject: field.
You can get a copy of Les Jones' FAQ on the Good Times Hoax from:
(2) There is no modem virus that spreads via an undocumented subcarrier - whatever that means....
(3) Any file virus can be transmitted as an E-mail attachment. However, the virus code has to be executed before it actually infects. Sensibly configured mailers don't usually allow this by default and without prompting, but certainly some mailers can support this: for instance, cc:mail can, it seems, launch attachments straight into AmiPro.
There's room for a lot of discussion here. The jury is still out on web browsers: Netscape can certainly be set up to do things I don't approve of, such as opening a Word document in Word without asking.
Microsoft have made available a Word viewer which reads Word files, but doesn't run attached macros. If possible, use this instead. If you have both Word and the Word Viewer, it is a good idea to set the Word Viewer as the default association instead of Word itself. This protects you from macro viruses to a certain extent, while not preventing you from using Word to edit documents (just use file/open instead of double-clicking on the file).
The term 'ANSI bomb' usually refers to a mail message or other text file that takes advantage of an 'enhancement' to the MS-DOS ANSI.SYS driver which allows keys to be redefined with an escape sequence, in this case to echo some potentially destructive command to the console. In fact, few systems nowadays run programs which need ANSI terminal emulation to run, and there's no guarantee that the program reading the file would pass such an escape sequence unfiltered to the console anyway. There are plenty of PD or shareware alternatives to ANSI.SYS that don't support keyboard redefinition, or allow it to be turned off.
The term mail bomb is usually applied to the intentional bombardment of an e-mail address with multiple copies of a (frequently abusive) message, rather than to the above.
(4) There is no known way in which a virus could sensibly be spread by a graphics file such as a JPEG or .GIF file, which does not contain executable code. Macro viruses work because the files to which they are attached are not 'pure' data files.
(5) In general, software cannot physically damage hardware - this includes viruses. There is a possibility that specific hardware may be damaged by specific code: however, a virus which drops a particular payload on the offchance that it's running on a system with a particular type of obsolete video card seems more than usually futile.
At least one virus (named CIH, AKA Chernobyl) contains code that can overwrite BIOS code on some machines. This does not constitute hardware damage, since the chip involved is still intact. Problem is, without the appropriate software on that chip, the system won't boot. Repair from this payload generally involves reprogramming the BIOS chip, which can be more expensive than just buying a new motherboard.
This also applies to other software mechanisms such as simulating hardware write-protection on a hard disk.
However, file protection rights in NetWare can help to contain virus infections, if set up properly, as can trustee rights. [Trustee assignments govern whether an individual user has right of access to a subdirectory: the Inherited Rights Mask governs the protection rights of individual files and (sub)directories.]
Basically, a file virus has the same rights of access as the user who happens to inadvertantly activate it.
Setting up these levels of security is really a function of the network Administrator, but you might like to check (politely) that yours is not only reassuringly paranoid but also knowledgeable about viruses as well as networks, since a LAN which is not, in this respect, securely configured, can result in very rapid infection and reinfection of files across the whole LAN. In particular, accounts with supervisor equivalence can, potentially, be the unwitting cause of very rapid dissemination of viruses.
[See also the comp.virus FAQ (version 2) section D]
As well, the most common viruses today are macro viruses, which depend on you running a commercial application (usually MS Word or Excel). They spread via documents exchanged between computers, which is a common occurrance on many systems, regardless of how 'connected' they are.
In brief, don't use FDISK /MBR unless you're very sure of what you're doing, as you may lose data. Note also that if you set up the drive with a disk manager such as EZDrive, you won't be able to access the drive until and unless you can reinstall it.
The /MBR command-line switch is not officially documented in all DOS versions and was introduced in DOS 5.0
When a PC starts up it reads the partition sector and executes the code it finds there. Viruses that use the partition sector modify this code.
Since the partition sector is not part of the normal data storage part of a disk, utilities such as DEBUG will not allow access to it. [Unless one assembles into memory]
Floppy disks do not have a partition sector.
FDISK /MBR will change the code in a hard disk partition sector.
When the PC starts up it attempts to read the boot sector of a disk in drive A:. If this fails because there is no disk it reads the boot sector of drive C:. A boot sector virus replaces this sector with its own code and usually moves the original elsewhere on the disk.
Even a non-bootable floppy disk has executable code in its boot sector. This displays the "not bootable" message when the computer attempts to boot from the disk. Therefore, non-bootable floppies can still contain a virus and infect a PC if it is inserted in drive A: when the PC starts up.
FDISK /MBR will not change the code in a hard disk boot sector (as opposed to the partition sector). Most boot sector viruses infect the partition sector of hard disks and floppy disk boot sectors: most do not infect the boot sector of a hard disk - the Form virus is an exception.
Most effective anti-virus products will be able to remove a virus from a partition sector, but some have difficulties under certain circumstances. In these cases the user may decide to use FDISK /MBR.
Unless you know precisely what you are doing this is unwise. You may lose access to the data on your hard disk if the infection was done by a virus such as Monkey or OneHalf. Part 4, section 14 of this FAQ contains details as to how losing data might happen.
If you boot with a disk in drive A which is infected with a boot-sector virus, the fact that the diskette is write-protected will make no difference at all.
Write-protecting a clean floppy will indeed prevent it from being infected (but see below!).
However, it is possible for the hardware to fail: it's not common, but it happens. Thus when I do a cleanup, I try to create a file on a sacrificial floppy before risking my R/O boot disk. Sometimes, I even remember....
Other caveats: a disk which you receive write-protected could have been de-protected, infected, and re-protected. Even a 3.5" disk with the write-enable tab removed can be written to by covering the hole with (e.g.) masking tape. And, of course, shrink-wrapped software could have been infected before the duplication process.
DIR A:It is possible to have a scanner report a virus in memory after a DIR of a floppy with an infected boot sector. The distinction here is that the virus is not actually loaded into memory, so the PC has not been infected.
This section hasn't been updated in a good while, and isn't likely to be in the near future, so it can't possibly be more than a rough guide to the issues.
In many countries, writing of viruses is not an offence in itself, whereas in others, not only is this not the case, but distribution, even the sharing of virus code between antivirus researchers is, at least technically, also an offence.
Once a virus is released 'into the wild', it is likely to cross national boundaries, making the writer and/or distributor answerable for his/her actions under a foreign legal system, in a country he/she may never have visited.
Where virus writing and distribution may not apply locally in a particular case, the individual may nevertheless be subject to civil action: in other words, where you may be held to have committed no offence, you may still be sued for damage.
Some of the grounds on which virus writing or distribution may be found to be illegal (obviously I'm not stating that all these grounds will apply at all times in all states or countries!) include:
The best advice to give to any one contemplating a possibly illegal act would be to contact their local Crown Prosecutor, Crown Attorney, District Attorney, or whatever label the local government prosecutor wears. Acting on the advice of one's own attorney doesn't render one immune from prosecution, and the cost of defence can be high, even if successful.
An extremely biased opinion is that very often attorneys attempt to provide the answer they believe the client wishes to hear, or give an opinion in areas where they have no real expertise. Prosecutors, on the other hand, tend to look at a particular action in the light of whether a successful prosecution can be mounted. If the local Crown Prosecutor were to suggest that something was a Bad Thing, I should be extremely nervous about doing it. :)
Many thanks to David J. Loundy for his assistance with the legalities regarding computer crime. A valuable source of information on this topic can be found in his E-Law paper, which can be accessed via the URL:
The question regarding the writing of malevolent computer viruses being illegal isn't really that hard to answer: It is illegal to write and spread a virus that infects a government system. Federal law is unclear as to whether this extends to private computer systems as well, but State statutes are frequently unequivocal about defining virus-related crimes against property.
The question has come up, however, about the distribution of viruses and virus-related programs. A general guideline is that it is legal to distribute viruses, for example, on a BBS, as long as the people who are downloading the virus know EXACTLY what they are getting. If you intentionally infect a file and make it available for downloading, you may be subject to prosecution. Your conscience should be your guide in this kind of a situation. If a virus distributed by you is used to damage or otherwise modify a major system, you can be held accountable.
Note that there are different kinds of distribution for viruses. If you simply make a virus available on a web page, and clearly label it as such, then you are unlikely to face any (criminal) consequences. The possibility exists, however, that you could be charged under "incitement" laws - in other words, it could be argued that distributing viruses on web pages (even if clearly labeled as such) amounts to inciting other people to use the viruses to break laws.
If you distribute the virus via newsgroups, however, you may be held liable. Distributing viruses via newsgroups, e-mail lists, and the like can lead to prosecution because these media 'push' viruses to people who would otherwise not want them on their systems. This is not the case with simply placing a virus on a web page (provided your ISP doesn't have problems with it). Keep in mind, however, that an ISP's stance on viruses can change quickly if negative publicity comes about due to their inaction in removing the viruses on their systems.
The reason that the explanations in this section are vague is that the laws in various states, provinces, etc., are different, and you should check with your local police before you decide you want to distribute viruses.
If you spread a virus unknowingly, you generally cannot be prosecuted unless it can be proven that you spread the virus due to pure carelessness. The definition of carelessness has not been tested in a court of law, as far as I know at the date of writing (9/22/95)
No mention is made in the Code (as of 1993) of computer viruses as such, but it would seem that prosecution under Sec. 430 (Mischief) or section 342.1 (Unauthorized use of computer) would be appropriate.
Apparently the laws governing trespass have not been considered as having any application in cyberspace. Offenders under section 342.1 would be charged with mischief, which covers a multitude of sins under Canadian law. The penalties stipulated in Sec. 342.1 are the same as the penalties for sabotage, just as a point of interest.
A prosecutor would probably deal with incitement (i.e. inciting somebody else to maliciously use viruses) under Sec. 21 (Parties to offence), Sec. 463 (Attempts), or Sec. 465 (Conspiracy).
Sec. 21-24 of the Criminal Code may be of interest because they detail aiding and abetting, incitement, and related issues which have some application in the realm of viruses.
Under certain circumstances, laws in other countries may be applicable in cyberspace, where there are no formal territorial boundaries. For instance, Sec. 465 (4) of the Canadian Criminal Code stipulates that every one, "while in a place outside Canada" conspires to commit an offence in Canada "shall be deemed to have conspired in Canada to do that thing."
If an action is a crime, then encouraging that action can also be a crime ("incitement").
If you spread a virus unwittingly, then it isn't a crime, as you don't have "intent".
If someone is negligent, and so spreads a virus (even unwittingly), then there could be a civil action for damages through negligence.
Computer Law & Security Report (periodical) - Elsevier Advanced Technology
Dr. Alan Solomon includes information on Hacking and Virus Laws in the UK and elsewhere on his webpage at:
I can't believe there's anyone left on the Internet who doesn't know the VCL password, but I'm not going to tell you anyway.
OK, maybe you want an assembler to learn assembly-language, not just to rehash prefabricated code. Where do you get TASM? You buy it from Borland or one of their agents, either stand-alone or with one of their high-level languages. If you want freeware or shareware, I guess you can still get the likes of CHASM and A86 (SimTel mirror sites in SimTel/asm).
Requests for viruses by people 'writing a new anti-virus utility' are usually not taken too seriously.
Valid testing of antivirus software requires a lot of time, care and thought and a valid virus test-set. Virus simulators are unhelpful in this context: a scanner which reports a virus when it finds one of these is actually false-alarming, which isn't necessarily what you want from a scanner.
Read Vesselin Bontchev's paper on maintaining a virus library:
Bottom line, 'viruses' is the correct English plural for the singular 'virus'. Viri, virii, and so on are all slang.
Tom Simondi points that there is an archive of sorts at Dejanews. You can search for several months of messages by subject at:
MIMESweeper has advanced content filtering abilities which go beyond its capabilities (with assistance from other software) for detection of file viruses and trojans.
These products do real scanning before the mail hits the workstation hard drive but make sure your mail attachments, WWW downloads etc. can't be automatically executed and use a good TSR/VXD in combination with a good on-demand scanner.
Note that realtime virus scanning at the gateway can add a heavy network overhead and probably won't catch as many viruses as checking all files from all sources with a desktop scanner.
Current informed thinking tends to be that detection of viruses at the firewall is acceptable (1) if you can afford the additional hardware, software and latency (processing overhead), not to mention the hidden administrative overheads of configuration and policy for dealing with boundary conditions such as unusual 7-bit encoding formats, encrypted files etc. (2) as long as you appreciate that it can only be supplementary to checking at the desktop, not a replacement. Mail attachments, FTP and HTTP are more significant vectors for virus transmission than formerly, especially with the near-exponential boom in macro viruses, but other vectors (especially floppy disks) are still of vital concern. System administrators are attracted by the fact that it's easier to update server software than control the use of scanning on individual workstations, but the fact remains that in most environments, until the desktop is adequately protected with good, up-to-date realtime (on-access) scanning and/or scheduled on-demand scanning, virus scanning at the perimeter is a semi-irrelevance.
For firewall-related information see the newsgroups
Building Internet Firewalls (Chapman, Zwicky) - O'Reilly
If you scan all drives at every boot, though, you may find that this gives you a good incentive to remove CDs from your CD drive before you power down, especially if your scanner isn't set to allow you to break out of a scan. B-)
There are virtually no circumstances under which you should need to reformat a hard disk, however: in general, this is an attempt to treat the symptom instead of the cause. Likewise, re-partitioning with FDISK is unnecessary.
If you use a generic low-level format program, i.e. one which isn't specifically for the make and model of drive you actually own, you stand a good chance of trashing the drive more thoroughly than any virus yet discovered.
In general, it's hard to imagine a situation where (e.g.) a maintenance virus is the only option. I have yet to see a convincing example of a potentially useful virus which needs to be a virus. Such a program would have to be much better written and error-trapped than viruses usually are.
A computer virus can cause unusual screen displays, or messages - but most don't do that. A virus may slow the operation of the computer - but many times that doesn't happen. Even longer disk activity, or strange hardware behaviour can be caused by legitimate software, harmless "prank" programs, or by hardware faults. A virus may cause a drive to be accessed unexpectedly (and the drive light to go on) - but legitimate programs can do that also.
One usually reliable indicator of a virus infection is a change in the length of executable (*.com/*.exe) files, a change in their content, or a change in their file date/time in the Directory listing. But some viruses don't infect files, and some of those which do can avoid showing changes they've made to files, especially if they're active in RAM.
Another common indication of a virus infection is a change to interrupt vectors or the reassignment of system resources. Unaccounted use of memory or a reduction in the amount normally shown for the system may be significant.
In short, observing "something funny" and blaming it on a computer virus is less productive than scanning regularly for potential viruses, and not scanning, because "everything is running OK" is equally inadvisable.
To make an emergency bootable floppy disk, put a disk in drive A and type
FORMAT A: /SBe careful to avoid 'cross-formatting', i.e. formatting a double-density disk as high-density or vice versa, if you system allows this. (You should avoid this all the time, not just when creating a boot disk. I'd also recommend avoiding single-density and quad-density disks, and there may be problems writing to double-density 5.25" disks on a different machine to the one on which they were formatted, if one machine is an XT and the other an AT or better.)
You can also make a pre-formatted floppy into a boot disk by typing
SYS A:I'd suggest you also COPY these commands from C:\DOS to it: ATTRIB, CHKDSK (or SCANDISK if you have DOS6), FDISK, FORMAT, SYS, and BACKUP and RESTORE (or whatever backup program you use, if it will fit). They may come in handy if you can't access the hard disk, or it won't boot up.
You may be aware that if there is a problem with your boot sequence, you can boot from the hard disk on a DOS 6/7/Win95 system while bypassing AUTOEXEC.BAT and CONFIG.SYS. This is not as good as a clean floppy boot: it won't help at all if you have a boot sector/partition sector infector, or if any or all of the basic operating system files have been infected by a file virus.
The boot disk should have been created with the same version of DOS as you have on your hard disk. It should also include any drivers necessary to access your hard disk and other devices (such as a CD-ROM). If, for some reason, you can't obtain a clean boot disk with the same version of DOS, you can often get away with booting from a (clean) disk using a different version, though: indeed, there are viruses which exploit a bug in recent versions of MS-DOS which will prevent a clean boot from DOS vs. 4-6. If you do use a different version, remember that you won't be able to use many of the standard DOS system utilities on the hard disk, which will simply return a message like 'Wrong DOS version' when you try to run them, and avoid the use of FORMAT or FDISK.
If you become virus-infected it can be very helpful to have backup of your hard disk's boot sector and partition sector (also known as MBR). Some anti-virus and disk utilities can do this. Other useful tools to include are a small DOS-based text editor (for editing AUTOEXEC.BAT, CONFIG.SYS and so forth), a copy of the DOS commands COMP or FC (for comparing files), FDISK and SYS (make sure they are from the same version of DOS as you are booting). There is a school of thought that your boot disk should also include your anti-virus software. The problem with this is that anti-virus software should be updated frequently, and you may forget to update (and re-write-protect) your boot disk each time. Ideally you will have been sent a clean, write-protected copy of the latest version of your anti-virus software by your vendor/supplier.
If you want to use the DOS program EDIT, remember that you need both EDIT.* and QBASIC.* on the same disk.
When you have everything you need on your boot floppy and any supplementary floppies (see below), make sure they're all write-protected!
A copy of PKZIP/PKUNZIP or similar compression/decompression utility may be useful both for retrieving data and for cleaning (some) stealth viruses. The MSD diagnostic tool supplied with recent versions of DOS and Windows is a useful addition. Heavy duty diagnostic packages like CheckIt! may be of use. There are some useful shareware/freeware diagnostic packages, too.
Obviously, these are not all going to go on one bootdisk. When you prepare a toolkit like this, make sure all the disks are write-protected!
Tech support types are likely to find that an assortment of bootable disks including various versions of DOS comes in useful on occasion. If you have one or two non-Microsoft DOS versions (DR-DOS/Novell DOS or PC-DOS), they can be a useful addition. DoubleSpaced or similar drives will need DOS 6.x; Stacked drives will need appropriate drivers loaded.
My understanding of the copyright position is that Microsoft does not encourage you to distribute bootable disks (even if they contain only enough files to minimally boot the system) unless the target system is loaded with the same version of MS-DOS as the boot floppy. Support engineers will need to ensure that they are legally entitled to all DOS versions for which they have bootable disks.
Data stored there are not loaded from there and executed, so virus code written to CMOS memory would still need to infect an executable program in order to load and execute whatever it wrote.
A virus could use CMOS memory to store part of its code, and some tamper with the CMOS Setup's values. However, executable code stored there must first be first moved to DOS memory in order to be executed. Therefore, a virus can NOT spread from, or be hidden in CMOS memory. No known viruses store code in CMOS memory.
There are also reports of a trojanized AMI BIOS - this is not a virus, but a 'joke' program which does not replicate. The malicious program is not on the disk, nor in CMOS, but was directly coded into the BIOS ROM chip on the system board. by a rogue programmer at American Megatrends Inc., the manufacturers.
If the date is 13th of November, it stops the bootup process and plays 'Happy Birthday' through the PC speaker. In this case, the only cure is a new BIOS (or motherboard) - contact your dealer. The trojanized chip run was BIOS version M82C498 Evaluation BIOS vs. 1.55 of 04-04-93, according to Jimmy Kuo's "What is NOT a virus" paper.
- From time to time there are reports from Mac users that the message 'welcome datacomp' appears in their documents without having been typed. This appears to be the result of using a trojanised 3rd-party Mac-compatible keyboard with this 'joke' hard-coded into the keyboard ROM. It's not a virus - it can't infect anything - and the only cure is to replace the keyboard.
In general, don't run anything downloaded from the Internet, BBSs etc. until it's been checked with at least one reputable and up-to-date antivirus scanner.
Most reputable, current anti-virus products will now alert on the EICAR anti-virus test file. See the following site for background on this file:
X5O!P%@AP[4\PZX54(P^)7CC)7}$EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!$H+H*Running the file displays the text "EICAR-STANDARD-ANTIVIRUS-TEST-FILE!".
The EICAR file isn't an indication of a scanner's -efficiency- at detecting viruses, since (1) it isn't a virus and (2) detecting a single virus or non-virus isn't a useful test of the number of viruses detected. It's a (limited) check on whether the program is installed, but I'm not sure it's a measure of whether it's installed correctly. For instance, the fact that a scanner reports correctly that a file called EICAR.COM contains the EICAR string, doesn't tell you whether it will detect macro viruses, for example. In fact, if I wanted to be really picky, I'd have to say that it doesn't actually tell you anything except that the scanner detects the EICAR string in files with a particular extension.
The string is supposed to trigger an alarm only when detected at the beginning of the file. Some products are known to 'false alarm' by triggering on files which contain the string elsewhere.
[I have Chengi Jimmy Kuo's permission to reproduce the following, a propos of the last-but-one paragraph]:
"The purpose of the EICAR test file is for the user to test all the bells and whistles associated with detecting a virus. And, if given that one platform detects it, is everything else working? It is to enable such things as:
The file serves no purpose in testing whether one product is better than another. Previously, every product had to supply its own test methods. This allows for an independent standard.'
Of course, other utilities such as ATTRIB can also be filtered through MORE like this, which may result in similar symptoms.
Essentially, you should avoid using FDISK /MBR unless you have it on good authority that it's safe and necessary to do so. In most circumstances, it's safer to clean a partition sector with a good anti-virus program.
You should avoid FDISK /MBR at all costs under the following circumstances:
The ICSA have a Corporate Virus Prevention Policy disk/document which can be ordered via their web page (www.icsa.net) for around $20, or downloaded from Compuserve.
In the UK, the British Standards Institution have a Code of Practice for Information Security Management which includes virus-management (BS7799). [It's not necessarily well-regarded by practitioners, though.]
DTI (Dept. of Trade & Industry)
IT Security Policy Unit
151 Buckingham Palace Road
London SW1W 9SS
[National Computing Centre, ICL, ITSEC, Dept. of Trade & Industry]
NCC
Oxford House
Oxford Road
Manchester
M1 7ED
(voice) +44(0) 161 228 6333
(fax) +44(0) 161 242 2171
enquiries@ncc.co.uk
http://www.ncc.co.uk/
This came up with the highly suspect but much quoted average of about #4000 per virus incident.
[Price Waterhouse, Priority Data Systems]
Price Waterhouse
Wilton Place
Dublin 2
(353 1) 6606700
++ Added August 18th.
For more information about the NCSA or for links to the members of the AVPD consortium:
EICAR - European Institute for Computer AntiVirus Research. Membership comprises academic, commercial, media, governmental organisations etc, with experts in security, law etc., combining in the pursuit of the control of the spread of malicious software and computer misuse. Membership is more open, but members are expected to subscribe to a code of conduct. And yes, this is the origin of the EICAR test file.
EICAR has a web page at http://www.eicar.org/
End of a.c.v. FAQ